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Abstract
We propose a new methodology for measuring intergenerational mobility in economic well-
being. Our method is based on the joint distribution of surnames and economic outcomes.
It circumvents the need for intergenerational panel data, a long-standing stumbling block
for understanding mobility. A single cross-sectional dataset is sufficient. Our main idea
is simple. If ‘inheritance’ is important for economic outcomes, then rare surnames should
predict economic outcomes in the cross-section. This is because rare surnames are indicative
of familial linkages. Of course, if the number of rare surnames is small, this won’t work. But
rare surnames are abundant in the highly-skewed nature of surname distributions from most
Western societies. We develop a model that articulates this idea and shows that the more
important is inheritance, the more informative will be surnames. This result is robust to
a variety of different assumptions about fertility and mating. We apply our method using
the 2001 census from Catalonia, a large region of Spain. We use educational attainment
as a proxy for overall economic well-being. A calibration exercise results in an estimate of
the intergenerational correlation coefficient of 0.60. We also find evidence suggesting that
mobility has decreased among the different generations of the 20th century. A complementary
analysis based on sibling correlations confirms our results and provides a robustness check on
our method. Our model and our data allow us to examine one possible explanation for the
observed decrease in mobility. We find that the degree of assortative mating has increased
over time. Overall, we argue that our method has promise because it can tap the vast mines
of census data that are available in a heretofore unexploited manner.
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tion genetics, assortative mating, siblings.
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1 Introduction
The empirical challenges to understanding intergenerational mobility are large. The main
reasons are data limitations. To address the issue directly, panel data is needed that links the
economic status of adults to that of their parents for multiple generations. The existence of such
data is rare. That which does exist (i) has been strongly criticized in terms of various biases, and
(ii) cannot address the question of how mobility has changed over time.1 This last point deserves
emphasis. The complexity of intergenerational mobility makes its measurement at a point in time
very difficult to do and interpret. Comparing measures of mobility across time would be far less
problematic ... if we had the data.
This paper attempts to make headway by introducing a new source of data: surnames and
how they vary with measures of economic well-being. We show that the implicit intergenerational
links that are inherent in surnames provide a useful stand-in for the explicit intergenerational
links that would exist in multi-generational panel data. We do so using both theory and data.
Our theory shows how surname data can allow one to estimate both the level and the change in
intergenerational mobility even in the absence of explicit links between children and their parents.
Our empirical work implements this idea. We use novel, census-based data from Catalonia — a large
region of Spain — to obtain measures of mobility both at one point in time and across generations.
The former yield, in a calibration exercise, estimates of the intergenerational correlation coefficient
of 0.60 across several different specifications of our model. The latter, more strikingly, provide an
estimate of how mobility has changed over time. We find that, among the different generations
of the 20th century, it has decreased. That is, the economic status of parents seems to have
become more closely related to that of their children. Why? Our methodology offers one potential
explanation. Assortative mating — the tendency for people with similar economic status to mate
with one another — has increased over time. We use our surname data to establish this and our
model to demonstrate how it is one potential source of a decrease in intergenerational mobility.
Our main idea is straightforward. Intergenerational mobility is all about how children inherit
aspects of economic well-being from their parents. In data, we can observe outcomes on economic
well-being, but, unless the data contain explicit knowledge of who is the parent of who, we are
unable to determine the degree to which the economic well-being has been inherited. However,
1See Solon (1992), Haider and Solon (2006), Hertz (2007) and Lee and Solon (2009). Extensive literature surveys
are available in Solon (1999) and Black and Devereux (2011).
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suppose that the data also allow us to observe surnames. Surnames are almost always inherited
from one’s father. Thus, they can serve as markers. They are intrinsically irrelevant for the deter-
mination of economic well-being, but they get passed from one generation to the next, alongside
other characteristics that do matter. The more important are these characteristics in determin-
ing outcomes, the more inheritable are the outcomes, and, therefore, the more information the
surnames will contain on the values of outcomes. In this way, surnames can be used to measure
the importance of inheritance and thus identify the degree of mobility. The following example
articulates this mechanism in more detail.
Consider a society comprised of two distinct groups of people: rich and poor. In each group there
are males and females, but, because surnames are (typically) passed along the male lineage, we will
ignore the females for now. Suppose that the males within each group all share the same surname:
Richmanson for the rich and Poormanson for the poor. This means that if we partition society
either by surname or by economic status, we get the same thing. We would say that, among this
initial generation, surnames are ‘perfectly informative.’ If you know a man’s surname, you know
his economic status. Now, how informative will surnames be among the subsequent generation?
The answer depends on the degree of inheritance. Consider two extremes. First, if inheritance is
‘perfect’ — meaning that there is no mobility whatsoever — then the economic status of all sons
would be identical to that of their fathers. Surnames, being passed from father to son in exactly
the same manner as economic status, would remain perfectly informative. Second, if inheritance is
irrelevant, so that the sons of both the Richmansons and Poormansons are equally likely to be rich
or poor, then surnames would become perfectly uninformative among the next generation. Thus,
the informativeness of surnames depends on the degree of intergenerational mobility. This is the
essence of the mechanism with which we are able to infer the degree of mobility.
Reality, of course, lies between these two extremes, and surnames carry some information. But,
there is a tendency for surnames to become non-informative as time goes on. To understand this,
suppose that economic status follows a stationary process with some degree of persistence, and that
this process is the same for both the Richmansons and the Poormansons. In this case, surnames
will remain informative among the sons of the initial generation, but the informativeness will not be
perfect. It will become less perfect with each subsequent generation. After enough generations the
cross-sectional distribution of status among both elements of the surname partition will be the same
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and the initial informativeness will have vanished. This is what makes our methodology somewhat
less than obvious. For surnames to contain information about intergenerational mobility there must
be something else going on that inhibits this convergence to a common stationary distribution.
The additional ingredient in our study is a birth-death process for surnames. Surnames die when
the last male holder of a particular name bears no male children. They are born when someone
mutates their name, or when a new name enters the population via immigration. This generates a
skewed surname distribution, with a small number of names each being held by a large number of
people and a large number of names each being held by a small number of people. The surname
distribution in most Western societies takes exactly this form.
Herein lies the key to our method: skewness in the surname distribution. We can’t learn
anything from the name Smith. The cross-sectional distribution among the Smiths is similar to
that among society as a whole. We can, however, learn something from the multitude of rare
surnames. This is because they form a partition of the population that is correlated with familial
linkages. Suppose, for example, that a rich person chooses a new, unique surname and that this
person’s male descendants maintain this name. Then, if mobility is low, this surname will be
informative for some number of subsequent generations. It will be shared by a bunch of rich
people. If mobility is high it will not be as informative. The same logic holds for a poor person
who changes their name, or for an immigrant with a distinct name. Over time these people’s
surnames will either die or will multiply. If they multiply, then, as discussed above, they are
likely to become less informative. But, overall, a stationary birth/death process will generate a
stationary commonality-ordered surname frequency distribution. There will always be some rare
names. These are the names from which we can extract information on intergenerational mobility.
An important issue for us is ethnicity. Early-generation immigrants, for example, tend to have
distinctive surnames and relatively low economic status. Surnames, therefore, contain information
on both familial linkages and ethnicity. Ethnicity, therefore, is likely to make surnames econom-
ically informative, in-and-of-itself. One might even think that the only reason that surnames are
informative is because they reveal ethnicity. We show that this is not the case. Our data permit
us to control for ethnicity and we find that, once we do, surnames remain informative. We provide
supplemental evidence indicating that this is because our methodology is able to reveal familial
linkages when applied to ethnically-homogeneous populations. Our method seems to be measuring
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what our theory indicates it should be measuring. We show this in Section 5 and go on to relate
it to existing papers on intergenerational mobility, a literature that typically amalgamates the in-
heritance of ethnicity with the inheritance of unobservable economic traits. Our approach allows
us to separately identify these things. We therefore report two sets of parameter estimates, those
that control for ethnicity and those that do not. The former serve to highlight a distinctive feature
of our methodology whereas the latter draws links to the existing literature.
Our method is not without its limitations, but they are counterbalanced by some important
strengths. One is that it is quite data-friendly. We are able to measure mobility from a single, cross-
sectional census. We do not require any explicit links between parents and children. As a result,
the censuses that are periodically compiled by many governments contain most of the information
that we require. Moreover, a great deal of confidentiality and anonymity can be maintained while
still allowing access to the necessary information. Surnames can be encoded without negating what
we do.
Our method can be applied to any country that follows the Western naming convention. Spain,
the source of our data, uses a variant of the Western convention that is identical to its Anglo-Saxon
counterpart, but with the additional ingredient of the maternal surname, which survives for one
generation. We show that knowledge of the maternal name can be exploited in three ways: (i) to
control for ethnicity, (ii) to determine the degree of assortative mating among the parents of an
individual, and (iii) to partition our data into sets of siblings. The latter affords us a powerful
robustness check on our methodology.
Existing literature that is closely related to our study is as follows. First, a number of papers
have studied the distribution of first names to understand phenomenon ranging from racial dis-
crimination and economic status (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), Fryer and Levitt (2004),
Levitt and Dubner (2005)) to mobility (Olivetti and Paserman (2011)). Endogeneity plays a key
role here. Parents choose first names and these choices can be related to parental characteristics.
Our study, in sharp contrast, makes use of the fact that surnames are surely much more exoge-
nous in nature, playing the role of innocuous markers. Second, papers that have used last names
to study economic phenomenon include Angelucci, De Giorgi, Rangel, and Rasul (2010), Bagu¨e´s
(2005), Collado, Ortun˜o-Ort´ın, and Romeo (2012a), Collado, Ortun˜o-Ort´ın, and Romeo (2012b),
Long and Ferrie (2011). These works use surnames as family links explicitly and intensively (i.e.,
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to determine familial links in a small sample) while we use them implicitly and extensively for the
whole population. Third, a large literature on mobility has devised many creative ways to over-
come limited panel data availability. Examples include Aaronson and Mazumder (2008), Dahan
and Gaviria (2001), Duncan, Featherman, and Duncan (1972), Levine and Mazumder (2007), Page
and Solon (2003), and Solon, Corcoran, Roger, and Deborah (1991). Again, most of these papers
rely on explicit familial linkages, the lack of which is a distinguishing feature of our approach.
Finally, most closely related to us is Clark (2013), who also uses rare surnames to study intergen-
erational mobility. What distinguishes our work is that (i) it predates his, being first published
as 2007 CEPR Discussion Paper #6316, (ii) we use data from a complete census thereby avoiding
selection issues, and (iii) we use an explicit model to map characteristics of the surname distribu-
tion into the intergenerational correlations that are typical in the literature. To our knowledge,
our paper is the first to use surnames to study intergenerational mobility in this manner.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define an empirical measure
of the extent to which surnames are informative for the economic status of their owners. We label
this measure the Informational Content of Surnames (ICS). Section 3 develops and analyzes a
model of the joint distribution of surnames and economic outcomes. This model maps the ICS into
an intergenerational correlation that is standard in the literature. Section 4 describes the census
data that we use to implement our model. Section 5 makes precise how we control for ethnicity
and how the parameters that we try to estimate relate to those that typify the literature. Section
6 reports results on mobility in Catalonia in the year 2001, and Section 7 uses these results to
calibrate our model. Section 8 reports results on how mobility has changed over time. Section
9 affirms the robustness of our methodology by constructing and analyzing an accurate proxy of
sibling correlations. Section 10 presents additional theory and evidence suggesting that changes in
assortative mating may have played an important role. Section 11 concludes.
2 The Informational Content of Surnames
The population consists of N individuals. Each individual is associated with one surname, s,
which is an element of the finite set of all possible surnames, Ω. A census is list with one entry
per individual in the population. The ith entry records individual i’s surname, a measure of
their economic well-being, eis, and a vector of additional characteristics, Xis, such as age, gender,
ethnicity, place of birth, etc. We model economic inheritance as being described by
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eis = γ
′Xis + yis (1)
yis = ρ yip + εis (2)
where γ is a vector of parameters, εis is an iid shock with variance Vε and yis is a set of unobservable
traits that are passed from parents, who have traits yip, to their children. The parameter 0 ≤ ρ < 1
measures the importance of economic inheritance.
We define the informational content of surnames (ICS) as the difference in the R2 between two
regressions. The first, with R2 denoted R2L, estimates Equation (1) for the average individual with
surname s
eis = γ
′Xis + b′D + residual , (3)
where D is an S-vector of surname-dummy variables with Ds = 1 if individual i has surname s
and Ds = 0 otherwise. Our methodology is based on the idea that as surname s becomes more
infrequent it becomes more likely that this average gets taken across individuals with familial
linkages, thereby providing information about economic inheritance. Note that surnames group
together different members of the same family (brothers, cousins, uncles, etc.) and not only fathers
and sons. Our model in Section 3 provides a mapping between our measure and the traditional
one based on father-sons.
The second regression mixes up the surnames so that they cannot be informative. It is
eis = γ
′Xis + b′F + residual , (4)
where F is an S-vector of ‘fake’ dummy variables that randomly assign surnames to individuals
in a manner that maintains the marginal distribution of surnames. The R2 from this regression is
denoted R2F . The ICS is defined as
ICS ≡ R2L −R2F . (5)
The ICS is a moment of the joint distribution of surnames and economic well-being that mea-
sures the incremental informational content of surnames. In our model it will turn out to be
monotonically increasing in the economic inheritance parameter, ρ.
The basic idea behind the ICS measure is this. Surnames define a partition of the population.
If the surname partition is informative about familial linkages — if some individuals with the same
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surname come from the same family — then it can be used to measure the importance of economic
inheritance. The fake-surname partition is constructed to have zero information about familial
linkages. By comparing the relative informativeness of the two partitions, therefore, we measure
the extent to which surnames contain incremental information.
The ICS measure has a number of important advantages. Suppose, for example, that every
individual had a unique surname. Then, by definition, surnames would contain zero information.
In this case R2L = 1 but ICS=0 indicating, as it should, that surnames contain no information. In
addition, the ICS insures us against spuriously attributing informativeness to surnames that might
be, instead, attributable to having many dummy variables in our regressions. This is important
because the number of surnames in a typical census is large and grows with the population size so
that the D matrix from Equation (3) has many columns.
In Section 6.1 we estimate the ICS using Spanish census data. Before doing so, we develop a
model that allows us to map ICS units into ‘inheritance units:’ an intergenerational correlation
coefficient.
3 Model
In Western societies the intergenerational transmission of surnames occurs primarily between fa-
thers and sons. We therefore begin by ignoring females. At date t − 1 the population consists
of Nt−1 males. Each individual reproduces with probability q. Conditional on reproducing, an
individual gives birth to m sons. Generations do not overlap. Fathers die after reproducing (or
failing to reproduce). The expected growth rate of the population is mq − 1, which we assume to
be zero.
Each of the Nt−1 individuals is associated with one surname from the fixed, discrete set Ω. The
typical element of Ω, denoted s ∈ Ω, can take on one of S different values (so that S ≡ #Ω). The
date t− 1 marginal distribution of surnames is Ft−1 : Ω→ [0, 1]. The number of active surnames
at date t − 1, denoted St−1 < S, is therefore equal to the number of strictly positive values of
Ft−1(s). If each individual has a unique surname then St−1 = Nt−1. Otherwise St−1 < Nt−1. In
reality — and in our model — Nt−1 is far greater than St−1. The initial distribution is denoted F0.
The surname distribution evolves from Ft−1 to Ft according to a birth/death process. The
death of a surname occurs if all fathers possessing that name bear zero offspring.2 Birth occurs
2The death of surname s can also occur if all sons of all fathers with surname smutate their names. Quantitatively,
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via mutation: a son acquiring a different (typically new) surname than his father. Mutations
are a necessary ingredient of our methodology. As we show in Section 3.1, without them the
surname distribution would neither be informative nor would it resemble the highly skewed nature
of observed surname distributions. Note that there is a certain irony here. Mutations seemingly
frustrate the surname researcher: they ‘destroy’ intergenerational linkages. Yet without them the
surname researcher would eventually be out of business.
Formally, mutation occurs as follows. At date t each existing name, s : Ft−1(s) > 0, will have
vanished, so that Ft(s) = 0, if all fathers possessing that name at (t− 1) bear zero offspring. This
occurs with probability (1− q)Ns where Ns = Ft−1(s)Nt−1, the number of fathers with name s. A
surviving surname matches that of the father with probability (1−µ) and mutates with probability
µ. A mutated surname is simply a new name, s ∈ Ω, chosen randomly.
Economic well-being is passed from fathers to sons according to Equations (1)–(2) with γ = 0.
That is, we ignore cross-sectional variation in the Xis directions so that individuals differ only in
terms of surname and economic inheritance, yis. Economic inheritance and well-being are therefore
the same thing, eis = yis, which we refer to as income for simplicity. Rewriting Equation (2), we
have that the income of individual i with surname s at date t is determined by
yist = ρ yip,t−1 + εist , (6)
where yip,t−1 is individual i’s father’s income, one generation removed. By definition the surname
associated with yip,t−1 is the same as that of yist (unless mutation occurs). Note that the mean of
yist is zero, meaning that we are dealing with demeaned data relative to what is implicit in Xis
from Equation (1).
Siblings are individuals with yist and yjst such that their surname s and parent p are the same
(again, ignoring mutation). Identical surnames can also be associated with cousins, second cousins
and so on. On the other hand, identical surnames can arise purely by chance, in the absence of
any familial linkages. The smaller is Ft−1(s), the less likely this is (e.g., if Ns = 1 it is impossible).
The sense in which ρ relates to families and inheritance is manifest in the the distinction between
the conditional and the unconditional variance of yist. For example, the cross-sectional variance
between siblings is equal to the conditional variance, Vε. For cousins it is Vε(1 + ρ
2). For the
however, the likelihood of this happening is dwarfed by the likelihood that these fathers simply give birth to zero
sons.
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entire population it coincides with the unconditional variance, Vε/(1 − ρ2). A larger inheritance
parameter, ρ, therefore implies lower cross-sectional variance between family members relative to
overall cross-sectional variance. The larger is ρ the larger will be the tendency for a surname to
link two people with similar incomes, relative to two people randomly chosen from the population
with, typically, different surnames.
3.1 Analysis
We now discuss the key features of our model. Some features can be characterized analytically while
for others we must rely on simulation-based evidence. For the simulations we use the following
baseline parameter values. First, we abstract from growth so that the expected population growth
rate, mq − 1 is zero. To achieve this, we set the reproduction probability to q = 1/2 and the
number of offspring to m = 2.
Second, we choose the conditional variance, Vε = 1, and the mutation rate, µ = 0.02. Third,
the initial number of individuals, N0, is set to 1 million and the initial surname and income distri-
butions are uniform. Finally, we vary the inheritance parameter, ρ, from 0.05 to 0.95. Whenever
appropriate we examine the sensitivity of our results to departures from these baseline values.
The most important feature of our model is that skewness in the surname distribution gives
rise to the informational content of surnames, and that this informational content is increasing in
the inheritance parameter, ρ. We demonstrate this in the following sequence of properties.
Property 1 : Random walk behavior
Suppose that there is no surname mutation, µ = 0, and the expected growth rate of the population
is zero, mq = 1. Then the number of individuals with surname s ∈ Ω follows a driftless random
walk with an absorbing barrier at zero.
The proof is in Appendix A. It is a simple consequence of the fact that the number of individuals
with a given surname is a binomial random variable. Its importance is that it tells us that mutation
is necessary for surnames to be informative. This is because a driftless random walk will, given
enough time, visit all parts of its sample space. Eventually, therefore, all but one (non-informative)
surname will disappear prior to the disappearance of the population (which, with mq = 1, must
also eventually happen).
Next we demonstrate the way in which mutation generates skewness and thus informativeness.
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To do so we work with the ordered frequency distribution, denoted Gt : [1, 2, . . . , S]→ [0, 1]. This
distribution simply provides the relative frequency of the most common surname, the second most
common surname, and so on. The long-run distribution associated with Gt(k) is denoted G(k), for
k = 1, 2, . . . , S.3
Property 2 : Skewed surname distribution
Given zero expected population growth, mq = 1, and a mutation rate, 0 < µ < 1, then for any
initial distribution, F0(s) (and the associated G0(k)), there exists a k > 0 such that, for all t > k,
the distributions Gt(k) display three key properties: (i) they are highly skewed, (ii) the number of
individuals per surname is a constant, (iii) the Gini coefficient is a constant.
Figure 1 plots time-series, t = 1 to t = 400, of the number of individuals per surname and
the Gini coefficient of the distributions Gt(k). In each graph there are four time series, each one
corresponding to a different initial condition for the number of surnames (described in the caption).
These moments of the distribution have clearly converged, thus validating Property 2. It is well
known that the Pareto distribution provides a good approximation of surname distributions in
many societies (Fox and Lasker (1983)). Since the Pareto distribution is completely characterized
by these two moments, it seems likely that Gt(k), also plotted in the figure for t > k (along with
the associated Lorenz curve), is a Pareto distribution. For our purposes, however, the exact form
of Gt(k) is not critical. What is critical is the behavior of the ICS, discussed below.
The skewness in Figure 1 is what drives our methodology. To understand why, consider first
the names that occur with a high frequency. Since the income process in Equation (6) is stationary,
the cross-sectional distribution among these names is very similar to that of the overall population.
These names therefore cannot be informative. In contrast, consider the very infrequent names.
Many of them derive from recent mutations. They are newly created names, or the names of sons
of fathers with newly created names, or grandsons, and so on. These names are markers that are
likely to identify people with familial linkages.4 If inheritance is important, so that these familial
3Formally, order the elements of Ω (arbitrarily) so that we can write Ω = {s1, s2, . . . , sS}. Define the ranking
function Ot : Ω → [1, 2, . . . , S] as that which ranks each surname according to its commonality so that, for each
k = 1, 2, . . . , S, Ft
(O−1t (k)) ≥ Ft(O−1t (k+ j)) for all j > 0 (ties are randomly allocated). Gt(k), for k = 1, 2, . . . , S,
is then Gt(k) ≡ Ft
(O−1t (k)). The long-run distribution is then defined as G : [1, 2, . . . , S] → [0 , 1] such that, for
k = 1, 2, . . . , S, G(k) = limt→∞E
[
Ft
(O−1t (k))]. Note that, since Ft(s) is necessarily random for all t, we define
G(k) as the expected fraction of the population associated with the kth most popular surname.
4For the same reason, surnames play an important role in the field of population genetics. The connection
actually goes even farther. In our model, surnames are innocuous markers. They have no direct effect on income.
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linkages connect people with relatively similar incomes, then the markers must make the same
connections and, thus, be informative for income.
To make this clearer still, consider the evolution of the surname distribution versus the income
distribution. They are (to this point) independent of one another. The frequency of a surname
cannot be informative for income, in-and-of-itself. That is, what is not going on is that ‘rich people
have uncommon surnames.’ What is going on is that low-frequency markers are indicative of
familial linkages and high frequency markers are not. This is just as true for the rich as it is for
the poor. 5
We now turn to our main result, the behavior of the ICS. The ICS is a moment of the joint
distribution of surnames and income. Even though the two are independent of one another, the
ICS connects them and reveals information about the latter based on the markers inherent in the
former.
Property 3 : ICS and the importance of inheritance
Under the conditions of Property 2 the ICS from Equation (5) is approximately constant for all
t > k. Moreover, for any t > k, the ICS is monotonically increasing in the value of the inheritance
parameter ρ.
The proof is in Appendix A. The monotonicity result is analytic whereas the constancy result is
shown via simulation.
Figure 2 plots the ICS against ρ for our baseline parameter values. Aside from confirming the
monotonicity property of Property 3, what’s quite striking is the level and the convexity. Relatively
small values for the ICS are associated with moderately large values of ρ and only for very high
values of ρ do we see ICS values above, say, 10%. Again, echoing comments made above, this is
necessarily the case given that only the rare surnames can be informative.
To summarize, the results of this section are as follows. First, without mutations the number
of surnames will tend to become small, with each name conveying very little information about
familial linkages and, therefore, inheritance. Second, mutations provide a countervailing force,
allowing many rare surnames to have informational content. Finally, the informational content of
Mitochondrial DNA, or the male Y-chromosome, is analogous. It does not code for any known protein and has no
effect on the differential survival or reproductive chances of the individual receiving it. Nevertheless, it is a useful
marker that allows researchers to uncover familial linkages.
5In Section 2 of our online appendix we relax the independence assumption by allowing fertility rates and the
mutation rate to depend on income. Our results do not change.
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these rare surnames — the ICS from Equation (5) — is, ceteris paribus, monotonically increasing
in the magnitude of the inheritance parameter, ρ. This is what allows us to identify the magnitude
of ρ from data on the joint distribution of surnames and economic outcomes. In Sections 1 and
2 of our online appendix we demonstrate that these results (i) are robust to different parameter
values, and (ii) are maintained in an extended model that features income-dependent fertility.
4 Data
We use data from two sources, the 2001 Spanish census and the 2004 Spanish telephone directory.
From the census we have individual-level data from the Catalonian region of Spain on surnames,
education and several other variables. From the telephone directory, obtained from Infobel, we
have surname data. We describe the data and its uses below. First, however, it is important to
understand how Spaniards name themselves and how this relates to our methodology.
4.1 Spanish Surnames
Spanish people have two surnames, ‘first’ and ‘second.’ The first is the first surname of their father
and the second is the first surname of their mother. First surnames, therefore, are passed between
generations in exactly the same manner as with the (traditional) Anglo-Saxon convention. Our
methodology is based, primarily, on first surnames. It can be used in exactly the same way for
males in Spanish societies as in many other Western societies.
This being said, the Spanish naming convention does offer additional information, information
that we make use of. Unlike the Anglo convention, each male is connected with his mother. In
addition, because females do not change their surnames upon getting married, each female is
connected to her father. Note that this has no bearing on the evolution of the paternal lineage.
The maternal surname vanishes after two generations.
We make use of this extra information in a number of ways. First, we use the second surname
as a control for ethnicity, leaving the first as an indicator of the importance of familial linkages.
Second, we use the combination of the two surnames to identify siblings and, thus, be more precise
about familial linkages (Section 9). Third, we use the combination of the two names to identify
the strength of ‘assortative mating’ and its importance for economic inheritance (Section 10).
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4.2 Data Description
The census data for Catalonia covers the entire population of 6,343,110 individuals. For each
individual we have their two surnames, some demographic characteristics (age, education, gender,
marital status, place of birth, place of residence), as well as employment status, level of proficiency
in the Catalan language and several housing characteristics (tenancy, size, inheritance, availability
of a second house).6 The census does not record information on wealth or income. We therefore
use years of education as our measure of economic well-being, y from Equation (6).
We eliminate individuals living in ‘collective households’ because the census has no educational
information on them. We also eliminate individuals for whom the first or second surname is
missing. This leaves us with 6,123,909 individuals. We eliminate females in order to be consistent
with the literature on intergenerational mobility. We eliminate males who are less than 25 years of
age so as to focus on individuals who have finished full-time education. We include only Spanish-
born, Spanish citizens so as to mitigate the extent to which surnames are informative because
they distinguish an immigrant who is likely to have relatively low education. Finally, we exclude
individuals with a unique first surname because such names cannot, by definition, provide familial
linkages with other individuals. This leaves us with our baseline population of 2,057,134 males.
We use data from the Spanish telephone directory (obtained from a commercial source) for the
purpose of controlling for ethnicity (Section 5). There are roughly 14 million households in Spain
and the directory contains surname information on roughly 11.4 million private, fixed telephone
lines. Mobile phones, which are not included, obviously account for the majority of the difference.
We have no reason to believe that the surname distribution differs across fixed versus mobile lines
and are therefore confident that the absence of the surnames of mobile-only households does not
affect our results.
4.3 The Surname Distribution
Figure 3(a) plots the commonality-ordered frequency distribution of the first surname (the empir-
ical counterpart to Gt from Property 2 in Section 3.1). The distribution is very skewed. There
exist a large number of low-frequency surnames and the few most frequent surnames represent a
6We define place of birth differently for those born in Catalonia versus those born elsewhere in Spain. If Catalan-
born, we use county dummies, otherwise we use Spanish province dummies. Catalan counties are administrative
units somewhat smaller than a typical U.S. county. Spanish provinces are somewhat larger than a typical French
departament.
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large percentage of the population. The 10 most popular names cover roughly 11 percent of the
population.
Figure 3(b) plots the Lorenz curve for the Spanish and Catalan surname distributions, using
both the telephone directory and census information for the latter. Table 1 reports the relevant
statistics for the three distributions. Notice that the number of people per surname is larger in
the whole of Spain than in Catalonia. This is probably because Catalonia is a net receiver of
immigration and because the Catalan language has, historically, had less orthographic rigidity
than the Spanish language. There are also more surnames in the census than telephone directory,
probably because each household typically has just one telephone line.
5 Ethnicity
To this point we have emphasized the ability of surnames to reveal familial linkages. However they
may also reveal ethnicity and this muddies the water. That is, sons inherit from their fathers (i)
unobservable economic traits, (ii) observable ethnicity, and (iii) a surname. Ethnicity and surnames
are often connected.7 So are ethnicity and economic outcomes. Surnames might therefore be
informative for economic outcomes simply because they are informative for ethnicity. Catalonia
is a good example. It is well known that native Catalan speakers (roughly half the population)
(i) have fairly distinctive surnames, and (ii) have high education and economic status relative to
non-native-Catalan speakers.8 This then begs the question, if surnames are informative, is this
primarily due to ethnicity? Or do direct familial linkages also play a role?
We address this question by controlling for ethnicity and thereby examining mobility among
ethnically-homogeneous partitions of the population. This allows us to answer the above question
7Surnames must eventually reveal ethnicity even if there are no ethnic differences in the initial distribution of
surnames. This is because the surname birth/death process is independent across ethnic groups. Assume that
there are only two ethnic groups, red and blue (r and b) with the red group being richer on average. A surname
mutation among the r group will generate a new name which, until the name dies-off, will only be associated with
the r ethnicity. A surname death among the b group will leave relatively more r ethnic-group individuals with this
name, thus increasing informativeness about ethnicity. The independent birth/death process will lead the r and b
surname distributions to drift apart over time. Eventually an individual’s surname will necessarily be informative
on whether his ancestors were of the r or b ethnicity. If ethnicity is related to other characteristics like income,
then surnames will also be informative on these characteristics, even though they may not have to begin with. An
example of paper that uses surnames to elicit ethnic information is Rubinstein and Brenner (2011).
8The reasons range from obvious to controversial. An obvious one is the initial condition. It is well known
that immigrants into Catalonia have been considerably less wealthy and less educated than the native population.
Controversial reasons include the linguistic advantage that native Catalan speakers have in the educational system
(see Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-Figueras, Costa-Font, and Masella (2008)), and a variety of forms of discrimination
that non-catalan speakers may be subject to.
14
and ask how the answer has changed over time. It also represents a departure from much of the
literature, so we must take care to interpret our measurements of the inheritance parameter, ρ from
Equation (6), appropriately. The literature has typically estimated a parameter that amalgamates
the effects of direct familial linkages with those of ethnicity. We prefer to separate the two so
that (ideally) ρ measures only the direct familial effects. This will tend to underestimate the ρ
parameter that is typically estimated in the literature and therefore overstate the conventional
measure of mobility. As such, we also report more comparable results in which we do not control
for ethnicity.
Our methodology works as follows. First, by considering only Spanish-born, Spanish citizens
we immediately eliminate non-Spanish ethnicities. This is because Spain (including Catalonia)
saw very little foreign immigration prior to the 1990’s. This leaves us with a Spanish population
for which the primary ethnic trait is regional origin: the region of Spain from which one’s family
originates. We measure this with the following index of the “Catalonianess” of each particular
surname s:
CatalanDegree(s) =
Number of telephones under surname s in Catalonia
Number of telephones under surname s in Spain
,
which we interpret as an estimate of the fraction of people with surname s that reside in Catalonia.
For example, since the 2001 Catalan population is about 16% of the total Spanish population, then,
if surnames were uniformly distributed throughout Spain, this ratio would be roughly 0.16. The
extent to which it’s higher (lower) indicates a concentration of people with surname s residing
inside (outside) of Catalonia.
We go one step further and interpret the CatalanDegree(s) variable as a proxy for the extent
to which a person with surname s has Catalan regional origin. In Appendix B we demonstrate
that this variable is indeed a good proxy of ethnic regional origin. It has strong predictive power
of both knowledge of the Catalan language and place of birth within Spain. Like any proxy for the
complex phenomenon of ethnicity, CatalanDegree is blunt. However it is the best proxy available
to us and it is better than self-reported ethnic identity (which anyway is not available).
We use the CatalanDegree(s) variable to control for ethnicity two different ways. First, in
our ICS regressions we include on the RHS the CatalanDegree(s) value associated with an in-
dividual’s second surname (their maternal surname). A dummy variable for their first surname
will be included for measurement of the ICS (Section 2, Equation (5)). Using the first and second
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surnames in this manner is meant to mitigate multicollinearity. Second, in Section 6.1, we con-
sider sub-populations of regionally-homogeneous groups. We calculate the geometric mean of the
CatalanDegree for both the first and second surname and then order the population according to
the associated values. We then identify upper 50% quantile as a homogeneous group of individuals
with Catalan regional origin.
6 Cross-Sectional Results
In this section we present results that are ‘static’ in nature. This means that we pool together
individuals from different birth cohorts. We obtain cross-cohort average measures of the ICS. In
Section 7 we use calibration to map them into measures of intergenerational mobility that are
comparable to those in the literature. In Section 8, in contrast, we condition on birth cohort and
obtain measures of how these things have changed over time.
6.1 The ICS in 2001
Table 2 reports a benchmark set of estimates of Equations (3–4) and the associated ICS from
Equation (5). Column 1 begins by including only individual controls — dummy variables for age
and place of birth. The adjusted R2 is 0.2652. Column 2 adds our CatalanDegree variable. The
coefficient is positive and highly significant. It’s also economically significant. The standard devia-
tion of CatalanDegree is about 0.3. Therefore, the estimate of 1.706 translates into an additional
0.5 years of education for a one-standard-deviation increase in a surname’s ‘Catalonianess.’ The
mean and standard deviation of education are 8.4 and 4.6, respectively. So Catalan regional origin
is associated with higher educational attainment equal to about 10% of the overall dispersion.
Column 3 of Table 2 adds paternal surname dummies to the regression (recall that maternal
surnames are used to define CatalanDegree). We note that (i) the surname dummies are jointly
significant (given the large number of RHS variables involved this is not obvious in spite of the
large population size), (ii) the coefficient of CatalanDegree is smaller but remains economically
meaningful, with a one-standard-deviation increase translating to 4 extra months of education,
and (iii) the R2 increases to 0.2980. Surnames are thus informative. Knowledge of the particular
surname of an individual is informative for predicting their educational attainment.
Column 4 replaces the actual surname dummies with ‘fake’ dummies as in Equation (4) of
Section 2. The fake dummies are not jointly significant and their presence increases the R2 very
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little. The estimate of the CatalanDegree coefficient is largely unaffected. Our estimate of the ICS
(controlling for ethnicity) from Equation (5) is, therefore, 2.45%. Columns 5 and 6 are analogous to
columns 3 and 4 except that the CatalanDegree variable is omitted. Since surnames now capture
both ethnicity and familial linkages, the ICS increases to 3.02%.
Tables 3(a) and 3(b) repeat the exercise of table 2, but restricting the population to those born
in Catalonia (table 3(a), immigrants are not included, even if their children are) and to those born
in Catalonia before 1950 (table 3(b)). The results are very similar to our benchmark in Table 2,
the only exceptions being that the R2s are smaller and the ICS is slightly higher. Both are to be
expected given that the population is more ethnically homogeneous.
One concern is that, in spite of our use of CatalanDegree, our results are dominated by ethnic
and not familial linkages. To examine this, Table 3(c) restricts the population to be the 50% of
those who have surnames with the highest CatalanDegree. The qualitative nature of our results is
unaffected, with the ICS being just slightly higher. Note that, encouragingly, the ICS is basically
unaffected by the inclusion of the CatalanDegree variable.
To summarize, our results show that surnames are informative for educational attainment. Part
of this is because surnames are informative for Spanish regional origin. But an important part
remains, even after controlling for regional origin in a variety of different ways. Our interpretation
— that elucidated by our model — is that the surname partition is informative about familial
linkages. We now present two additional pieces of evidence that support this interpretation.
6.2 Rare Surnames are More Informative
Our model predicts that, if inheritance is important, surnames will be informative because the
partition of rare surnames should group together people with familial linkages. This then implies
that the ICS should increase as we exclude common names. Checking this in the data provides a
valuable check on our interpretation of our results.
Table 4 repeats the exercise of Section 6.1 but includes only the 50% of the population with the
least-frequent surnames. As our model predicts, the ICS increases. It does by a factor of roughly
1.5 (with and without ethnicity controls) relative to Table 2. Figure 4 provides additional evidence.
It is based on a series of regressions, analogous to those in Table 2, that sequentially include people
with more and more common surnames, as we move from left to right on the horizontal axis.
The left vertical axis reports the ICS — the downward-sloping line — and the right axis reports
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the average number of individuals per surname in each sub-population. Figure 4 provides strong
evidence in favor of our model’s interpretation of the ICS. Moving from least frequent names to
the most frequent, the ICS monotonically falls by a factor of five. This suggests that our controls
for ethnicity are working and that our findings are driven by the informativeness of surnames for
familial linkages.9
6.3 Invented Catalonias
Our results should not be sensitive to any random (but sufficiently large) partitioning of the
surnames set. One such partition is simply based on the alphabet. If, for example, we randomly
assign letters of the alphabet to two groups, “first half” and “second half,” then the ICS should
be unaffected. This is what we find in Appendix C. This suggests that our findings are structural
and that they depend on deeply rooted social and economic mechanisms.
7 Calibration
We now calibrate the model of Section 3 using the results of Section 6. The main task is to obtain
a value of the inheritance parameter, ρ, that (i) results in our model’s ICS matching that of the
data (Table 2), while at the same time (ii) results in our model’s surname distribution matching
key aspects of the observed surname distribution from Catalonia.
It is important to be clear about the precise interpretation of the parameter that we estimate,
especially in relation to the existing literature. What distinguishes the ICS from the traditional ap-
proach is that it identifies familial linkages and then asks how much of the cross-sectional variation
in the data can be attributed to these linkages. This stands in contrast to the traditional approach,
which estimates the father-son correlation directly. The ICS is a different empirical moment than
the direct father-son correlation. Nevertheless, the economic parameter that we calibrate is the
same. In our model, ρ is the father-son correlation. All other familial correlations are functions
of ρ. The grandson-grandfather correlation, for example, is ρ2. For cousins, it is ρ4. The ICS
is a complex amalgamation of these correlations that depends on all of the model’s parameters
9It is important to understand what Figure 4 says and what it does not say. It says that as average surname
frequency decreases, the informativeness of the individual surnames increases. It does not say anything about the
informativeness of the individual surname frequencies. The latter would ask, for example, ‘is someone with a rare
surname likely to be highly educated?’ This is not what we are asking here. It does, however, get addressed in
Section 3 of our online appendix. We find that (i) surname frequencies are mildly informative, and that (ii) the
important properties of the ICS are nevertheless unaffected.
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(mutation, fertility, etc.). In spite of this complexity, however, what we attempt to measure is
simple. It is the same father-son correlation that the literature has empirically estimated using
direct observations on fathers and sons.
Our baseline model has five parameters. They are ρ, the inheritance parameter, µ, the surname
mutation rate, m, the number of sons conditional on giving birth (‘family size’), q the probability of
having sons (‘fertility rate’), and
√
V, the conditional standard deviation of educational attainment.
The latter merely scales things and does not affect the main object of interest, ρ. We set it so that
the unconditional standard deviation matches that of our data.10 In our baseline model the fertility
rate is pinned down by the zero-growth condition at q = 1/m. Our enhanced model, discussed
below, features a more prominent role for q.
This leaves us with ρ, µ and m. We calibrate these parameters to match the ICS and the
surname distribution. Regarding the latter, it is well known that the Pareto distribution provides
a good approximation of surname distributions in many societies ((Fox and Lasker (1983))). The
Pareto distribution (for surnames) is fully characterized by two moments, the Gini coefficient and
the number of persons per surname (PPS). Our calibration exercise, therefore, consists of choosing
three parameters, (ρ, µ,m), to match three moments, (ICS,Gini,PPS).
The structure of our model allows us to proceed recursively. The following properties are
established, numerically, in Section 4 of our online appendix. First, the Gini coefficient is hump-
shaped in the mutation rate, µ, with the value of µ that maximizes the Gini coefficient being
(essentially) independent of both ρ and m. This maximum falls short of the observed Gini for all
parameter values, so we begin by setting µ to attain the maximal Gini coefficient. Second, given a
value for µ, the PPS does not depend on ρ, so we choose m to match the observed PPS. Finally,
we choose ρ to match the ICS. The results are shown in Column 2 of Tables 5 and 6. The latter
is based ethnicity-controlled ICS. For the former, no such controls are employed.
The most important findings in Tables 5 and 6 are our calibrated values for ρ. We find that
the observed ICS maps into an inheritance parameter of ρ = 0.568 for ethnicity-adjusted ICS
and ρ = 0.597 for ICS without ethnicity controls. These values are near the top of the range of
estimates from the literature, which tend to be in the neighborhood of 0.4 to 0.6.11
10For given a value of ρ, we set V = (1− ρ2)(4.7)2, where the standard deviation of education in our data is 4.7
11For Spain, Kalkbrenner and Villanueva (2007) estimate educational mobility from the “Encuesta de Conciencia
y Clase de Biografia” for 1990-91 and obtain estimates between 0.42 and 0.52 among fathers and sons. Also for
Spain, Pascual (2009) examines income mobility using the European Community Household Panel and reports an
elasticity of 0.3 among fathers and sons. More broadly speaking, a value between 0.4 and 0.6 is typical for U.S. data
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Our calibrated value for m, m = 5, is obviously unrealistic. However, more than anything,
this a reflection of the simplicity and restrictiveness of our model’s demographics structure. If,
for instance, m were to be minimal (subject to the zero-growth condition) at m = 2, this would
still imply that the average family with children would have two sons, implying a far larger family
size than that prevailing in Catalonia in 2001. The simplifying assumptions that we have made
imply that our model cannot be thought of as a good model of the joint distribution of family
composition and surnames/education. Ours is a model of the joint distribution of surnames and
education. What is reassuring is that, as we show below, our model’s implications for ρ are largely
independent of this issue and the particular value for m that we use.
Our calibrated value of µ lends credibility to our exercise in the following sense. We can obtain
an empirical estimate from our data. In 2001, in all of Spain, there were 1,570 applications to
change one’s surname. Of these, 1,426 were granted. Assuming that 2001 is a representative year,
and a population of forty million with a live expectancy of 70 years, this translates to a mutation
rate of around 0.0025. Our estimate of 0.0067 is 2.68 times larger. The empirical estimate, however,
is surely lower that the mutation rate that would be a good analog for our model. Immigration,
for example, is entirely absent from the empirical estimate but is implicit in our model and is
explicitly an important factor for our ICS estimates. Whether or not the incorporation of such
effects would reflect well on our estimate of 0.0067 is difficult to say. We are not aware of data with
which we could examine this. We simply emphasize that our estimate arises in an unconstrained
fashion in order to most closely match a key moment in our entire exercise, skewness in the surname
distribution. The value that we arrive at is certainly in the set of plausible values.
Next we conduct a sensitivity analysis. Each cell in Table 7 shows the result of holding a given
pair (µ,m) fixed and choosing ρ to match the ICS. What we see is a lot of variation across rows
(values of µ), but little variation across columns (value of m).12 We interpret this as saying that
our model’s implications for ρ are robust. What we mean is as follows. First, in the neighborhood
of the calibrated pair, (µ,m) = (0.0067, 5), the implications of variation in m are small. This is
reassuring. As is discussed above, the simplicity of our model’s fertility structure implies fairly
for the latter third of the 20th century. Solon (1992), in the context of the various biases that plague panel-data
estimation, argues for a value of 0.4 or higher.
12The small discontinuity that is apparent in moving between column m = 2 and m = 3 is an artifact of the grid
of value at which we evaluate the (µ,m) pairs. The function is more convex in the neighborhood of m = 2 than for
higher values of m. Nevertheless, the implications for ρ are not large. In addition the small differences in ρ between
Tables 5 and 7 are also artifacts of this grid and the linear interpolation scheme that we use to match exactly the
empirical moments.
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unrealistic implications for the cross-sectional distribution of children in each household. But our
model’s implications for the main parameter of interest are not sensitive to this parameter. Second,
the variation in ρ across rows in Table 7 doesn’t say that our model is not robust. Rather, it says
that our model is well identified in the joint directions (µ, ρ). We are confident that the skewness
in the surname distribution (as is manifest in the Gini coefficient) maps uniquely to a particular
value of µ, and this value maps the observed ICS uniquely into a particular value of ρ.
7.1 A Model with Differential Fertility
Our baseline model does not allow for any sort of dependency between the surname distribution
and the education distribution. Such dependency would exist if any of the mutation rate, µ, the
fertility rate q, or the family size, m, were to be dependent on economic status. In Section 2 of our
online appendix we examine each type of dependency in turn and show that the basic properties
that make the ICS a desirable measure of mobility are unaffected. Here, we examine the extent to
which our calibrated value for ρ is affected. We focus on the fertility rate, q, because we have an
additional empirical moment with which it is identified. This moment is surname frequency. When
we regress surname frequency on education we get a point estimate of −31.26 (details are provided
in Section 3 of our online appendix). The negative sign indicates that lower-frequency surnames
are associated with higher educational attainment. This effect, while small — it translates into just
0.19 years of additional education for a one-standard deviation reduction in frequency — identifies
differential fertility in our model.
We modify our model as follows. Fertility rates are denoted qj, with j = l,m, h denoting the
lower fifth, the middle 3 fifths and upper fifth of the education distribution. Family size, m, does
not vary across educational groups. Zero growth implies that m(ql/5 + 3qm/5 + qh/5) = 1. We set
ql = (1 + d)/m, qm = 1/m, and qh = (1 − d)/m, so that d is the incremental rate by which the
highly educated are less likely to have sons than the average-educated. We call this our differential
fertility rate model. All other aspects are identical to our baseline model.
Our calibration procedure must now account for the fact that the surname distribution and the
education distribution interact. We proceed as follows. There are now 4 parameters of interest, µ,
m, d and ρ. As above, we find that µ governs the maximal Gini coefficient and that the maximum
is essentially independent of the other parameters. Likewise, PPS depends on m in a manner that
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does not depend on the remaining two parameters. We therefore choose µ and m first. Next, we
choose values for ρ and d simultaneously to match the ICS and the frequency coefficient from the
dummy variable regression of −31.256. The calibrated values are reported in Tables 5 and 6. We
see only minor changes in ρ relative to the baseline. The calibrated value of d is −0.15, indicating
that the highly educated are 3% less likely to have offspring that the average educated.
7.2 Calibration: Summary
Our methodology results in an estimate of the inheritance parameter of about ρ = 0.60. This
finding is robust to an enhancement of our baseline model that incorporates differential fertility
and that matches some evidence on the informativeness of the relative frequency of surnames.
The main “overidentifying test” of our estimates is the extent to which they are associated with
a plausible surname mutation rate. We argue that this is indeed the case. Finally, an important
methodological point is this. The foundation of our exercise is the ICS — the incremental R2
from the various dummy-variable regressions that we estimate. These incremental R2s are small in
variance decomposition units. They are on the order of 2 or 3 percent. In the more economically-
interesting “inheritance units” of ρ, however, they are large. They are on the order of 0.60. Small
values for the ICS are the nature of our exercise. We extract information from a highly-skewed
surname distribution in which the most prevalent names (e.g., “Rodr´ıguez”) cannot be informative
whatsoever. Small R2 values must necessarily arise. But they are not indicative of small economic
magnitudes.
8 Dynamic, Cohort-Based Results
Our analysis to this point has treated the entire 2001 Catalan census as a single cross-section. The
cross-section, of course, consists of individuals of different ages. We have dealt with education-
related age effects using dummy variables. But we have not allowed the ICS to vary with age. The
above estimates are age-averaged measures of the ICS. They are ‘static’ in the sense that they are
incapable of saying anything about how the ICS and intergenerational mobility may have changed
over time. As mentioned before, little is known about the time evolution of mobility.13
13The short time dimensions of the panel datasets make it very difficult to assess the dynamics in mobility.
Moreover, Lee and Solon (2009) and Hertz (2007) attribute a fairly divergent body of existing results to small-
sample bias in addition to the aforementioned age bias and sample attrition problems (c.f., Mayer and Lopoo (2005)
and Fertig (2004)). Taking this into account leaves the authors inconclusive about trends in intergenerational
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We turn now to a dynamic analysis. We partition the cross-section into birth cohorts and
ask if the ICS varies across subpopulations of different ages. If it does, our model suggests that
intergenerational mobility may have changed over time. The reasoning is as follows. Suppose that
mobility has decreased, so that the value of ρ connecting the current young generation to their
parents has increased. Our model’s prediction is that, if the surname distribution of the parents
is highly skewed (which it is), then the surnames of the young should be more informative than
those of the old. The change in mobility should generate a change in the ICS. Why? For the same
reasons as above. A higher value of ρ implies that that familial linkages will be more informative for
economic status. A skewed surname distribution of parents means that the surname distribution
of children will be informative for familial linkages.
There are, of course, alternative interpretations for why the ICS may have changed over time.
One possibility is a change in the birth/death process for surnames. We discount this possibility
for one simple reason. Such a change must necessarily affect the ICS via its effect on the surname
distribution. This effect will occur very slowly. Its immediate effect on the ICS, therefore, must
be very small. A change in ρ, in contrast, will have an immediate impact on the ICS because
the channel through which it works is not the slow-moving surname distribution. Our empirical
robustness checks (in Section 9) and our assortative mating exercise (in Section 10.2) serve to
bolster this point and provide reassurance that we are capturing changes in ρ.
Figure 5 reports our results. We run the same set of regressions as those in Table 2 for a rolling
sequence of overlapping 25-year age cohorts. Figure 5 reports the evolution, from oldest cohorts
to youngest cohorts, of the ICS and the point estimate of the parameter on our CatalanDegree
variable. What we see is striking. Figure 5(a) shows that the ICS is substantially higher for
younger cohorts. Figure 5(b) shows that regional origin has become more important for deter-
mining educational outcomes. Figure 6 reports the evolution of the ICS when not controlling for
ethnicity. As expected, the ICS is higher when it amalgamates familial and ethnic effects (Section
5).14 Finally, Figure 7 conducts the same sort of robustness checks that were undertaken for the
single cross-section in Section 6. The temporal behavior of the ICS is qualitatively the same and
quantitatively larger when we restrict the population to those with high CatalanDegree surnames
mobility. One exception is Blanden, Goodman, Gregg, and Machin (2004), who argue for a decrease in mobility in
the U.K. between two cohorts of people born in 1958 and 1970, respectively.
14Section 6.1 of our online appendix provides regression details and additional results for a more coarse set of
cohorts, those born before/after 1950.
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(a much more homogeneous group in the ethnic dimension) and those low surname frequencies.
We interpret these results as indicating that intergenerational mobility has decreased in Catalo-
nia, both because of an increased importance of ethnicity and an increased importance of familial
linkages for determining educational outcomes.15 In Section 9 we substantiate this interpretation
further by examining a proxy of sibling correlations. In Section 10 we offer and substantiate a
potential explanation: increased assortative mating. Before doing so we offer some interpretative
discussion of these findings as they relate to important historical trends in 20th-century Catalonia.
8.1 Public Education
Decreased mobility in Catalonia is particularly striking when held against the backdrop of the
large, secular changes that occurred in publicly-provided education in Catalonia and Spain during
the mid 20th century. Others have also found a similar result (c.f., Checchi, Ichino, and Rustichini
(1999), Grawe (2010) and Parman (2011)). In Spain, prior to the 1950’s access to education was
very limited. This was a consequence of both the general level of wealth and income as well as
the lack of investment in public education. Starting in the late 1950’s things began to change.
Both the economy and the level of public education began to grow, particularly from 1975 onward.
This shows up clearly in our data. Figure 8 plots the mean and standard deviation of the years
of education for the same overlapping sequence of 25-year age-cohorts that we used above. It
demonstrates that the average years of education of the oldest individuals in 2001 is less than half
that of the youngest. Variability around the average, in contrast, is more stable.
How is ‘more education for all’ associated with intergenerational mobility in educational attain-
ment? Does an increase in publicly-provided education decrease the importance of how educated
one’s parents are? While the intuitive answer might be yes, our results show that intuition does
not fit the facts. Such intuition confuses aggregate growth with cross-sectional mobility. Mobility
is a relative concept. Aggregate growth is not.
8.2 Increase in the Importance of Ethnic Background
Our point estimates of the coefficients on the CatalanDegree variable have increased, indicating an
increase in the importance of ethnicity (Figure 5(b)). Note that this cannot be a direct consequence
of the migration process. In our regressions we include not only the children of immigrants, but
15Note that our main finding is still valid if we disregard the older cohorts.
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also the immigrants themselves. Thus, our result indicates that CatalanDegree is more important
for measuring the education of the second than of the first generation of immigrants. It is not the
case that it increases because there are more immigrants. Note also that this does not mean that
low CatalanDegree individuals have obtained less education, but that their difference vis-a`-vis
high CatalanDegree individuals has increased. The increase in educational attainment has been
large for both ethnic groups, but has affected Catalan speakers more than non-Catalan speakers.
In Catalonia there are two main linguistic communities, Catalan and Castillian (Spanish),
each representing roughly half the population. Catalan speakers have enjoyed substantially larger
incomes and larger levels of educational attainment during the entire period of our study (this
is true for both those born before and after 1950). Nevertheless before the late 1970’s there did
not exist any formal linguistic advantage toward Catalan speakers. The language of government,
commerce and education was overwhelmingly Spanish. However, beginning in the late 1970’s the
increasing political power of Catalan nationalism has translated into a series of drastic legal and
administrative reforms that have turned upside down the relative importance of both languages in
society while changing only marginally its overall language composition.16 For example, since the
beginning of the 1980’s all education is provided exclusively in Catalan in all public and practically
all private schools. Catalan is now the sole language of the regional and municipal governments,
and proficiency in Catalan has been the key requirement for working in public administration since
the beginning of the 1980’s. Further legal change has made Catalan an important (albeit perhaps
not the main) business language.
Governmental and institutional changes in the use of Catalan are, at best, a partial explanation
for what we find. A deep understanding of the increase in the value of ethnicity is beyond the
scope of this paper. Note, however, that in Section 10.2 we do dig a little deeper and show that
assortative mating seems to have increased in Catalonia along ethnic lines. This makes ethnicity
more inheritable and serves to magnify the effects of any institutional changes on the educational
outcomes of the offspring of those who assortatively mate.
16See Miley (2004) for a study of the politics of nationalism and language in Catalonia. The increasing power of
Catalan nationalism might be explained (i) by the larger levels of income and education of the Catalan speaking
community and (ii) because Spanish electoral law has allowed Catalan nationalism to operate as a third party in
Spanish politics, allowing it to obtain high leverage from its successive alliances with either left or right leaning
governments. See also Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-Figueras, Costa-Font, and Masella (2008) for a study of the effects
of linguistic legislation on the educational system on identity.
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9 Analysis of Siblings
An established alternative to father-son correlations is sibling correlations (Solon, Corcoran, Roger,
and Deborah (1991)). The reasoning is simple. If economic inheritance is important then the
outcomes of siblings should be correlated because they share parents and, thus, they share the
same inherited economic traits. In this section we make use of this logic to provide an important
robustness check on our results.
We make use of Spaniards’ maternal surnames to approximate who is a sibling with whom.
We argue that this approximation is very accurate. We use it to construct an alternative measure
of mobility, one which is conceptually distinct from the ICS. We then compare the time-trend in
the siblings-based measure to that of the ICS (from Section 8). This comparison serves as our
robustness check.
We identify siblings in the following manner. Recall that all Spaniards have two surnames, one
from their father and one from their mother. Thus, all siblings (irrespective of gender and marital
status) share not one but two surnames, as well as their ordering. This allows us to construct a
partition of the population that groups together individuals who have a high likelihood of being
siblings.
More specifically, define the “complete–surname” for an individual to be their two surnames, in
order. That is, if a person’s father and mother are named Ferna´ndez and Caballe´, respectively, then
their complete–surname is “Ferna´ndez Caballe´”. This is distinct from both “Caballe´ Ferna´ndez”
and “Ferna´ndez Vila”. Next, group each person together with those who share their complete–
surname. This partition will be very similar to the actual sibling partition (which we cannot
observe), with the similarity increasing in the rarity of the surnames. The reason is that it’s very
unlikely for two males who share the same rare surname to marry two females who share the same
rare surname, thus generating children who are not siblings with the same complete–surname.
What is much more likely is that two individuals with the same rare complete–surname are in fact
siblings. We therefore focus on matches of rare, complete–surames.
We proceed as follows. We partition the population according to complete–surname. In order to
increase the probability of matching siblings, we then extract the subpopulation of those individuals
who share their complete–surname with either one or two other individuals.17 As above, we run
17We do this in order to approximate even better the sibling relationship. We purge the data from names like
“Garc´ıa Pe´rez” which being the concatenation of two very common surnames, are more likely to be shared by
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two regressions, one with legitimate complete–surname dummy variables and one with fake dummy
variables. We define the Sibling Correlation Proxy (SCP) as the difference between the R2’s from
these regressions.
Figures 9 and 10 report results that serve as a powerful robustness check on our method and its
findings. Figure 9 shows the evolution of the SCP over time for those who share their complete–
surname only one other person, and for those who share it with at most two other people. Figure 9
cannot control for ethnicity because our CatalanDegree variable and the complete–surname dummy
are based on a common surname. Figure 10 shows the same thing for the subpopulation with the
50% most Catalan surnames, resulting in a more ethnically homogeneous population. In both
cases we see a marked increase over time in the SCP, the same patter as we observed in the
ICS of Section 8. The two measures are conceptually and mechanically quite different from one
another. Yet our model and the existing literature suggest that they are both legitimate measures
of changing mobility. The fact that they tell the same story provides important reassurance to our
interpretation of the ICS.18
10 Assortative Mating
In this section we develop and test one possible explanation for our finding that mobility has
decreased over time: an increase in assortative mating.
Assortative mating refers to the tendency of people with similar characteristics to marry each
other.19 At first blush, it may seem intuitive that assortative mating can give rise to the ICS
because, ostensibly, it can generate “organization” in the distribution of surnames. If, for instance,
today’s rich and poor have distinct surnames, and if the rich marry the rich and the poor marry
the poor, then one might think that the rich and poor surnames will remain distinct among future
generations, thus generating informativeness. One might apply a similar argument to ethnically-
non-siblings.
18 In Section 5 of our online appendix we explain that the SCP is much higher number than the ICS because
our proxy of the sibling partition is a very different (and much finer) partition of the data that approximates very
closely the sibling relationship. The ICS, on the other hand, is a more coarse partition that is informative on family
relationship broadly understood. Since the SCP and the ICS are based on very different partitions of the population,
their values are not directly comparable. We also present the results using the whole population and show that they
are qualitatively identical. Section 6.2 of the online appendix reports the same exercise splitting the population into
those born before/after 1950.
19The existing literature on mobility that incorporates assortative mating includes Lam and Schoeni (1993),
Chadwick and Solon (2002), Ermisch, Francesconi, and Siedler (2006) and Holmlund (2006). There is also a rich
literature in macroeconomics that focuses on assortative mating and inequality (e.g., Ferna´ndez and Rogerson
(2001), Ferna´ndez, Guner, and Knowles (2005) or de la Croix and Doepke (2003)).
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motivated assortative mating. In either case, this intuition is deeply misleading. This is because
the degree of assortative mating does not have any direct effect on the marginal distribution of
surnames in the population. The reason is simple. Surnames are passed along the male lineage.
For surname determination, it does not matter why one’s father married one’s mother, all that
matters is one’s father’s name. It is as if females had no surnames.20
What assortative mating does matter for is the joint distribution of surnames and character-
istics. This is because, if inheritance occurs along both the maternal and the paternal lineage,
more assortative mating amounts to the increased prevalence of inheritance. In the language of
our model, more assortative mating increases the father-son inheritance parameter, ρ, and, via this
mechanism, it increases the ICS. We now enrich our model to make this mechanism precise. The
model is richer in that it articulates the mapping between assortative mating and the inheritance
parameter that we have estimated above. The model does not, however, have any bearing on the
estimates themselves. This is because, in our enriched model, if we take ρ as given, the process
that generates the joint distribution of surnames and income is identical to that of Section 3.
10.1 A Model of How Assortative Mating Affects Inheritance
We now treat Equation (6), which correlates the income of fathers and sons, as endogenous. What
is exogenous is (i) the manner in which the income of sons and daughters depends on the income
of both their father and their mother, and (ii) the manner in which boys and girls sort at the time
of mating. There is a continuum of males and females who form households and bear offspring.
Expanding on the notation, ymist and y
f
ist denote the incomes of male and female children who
inhabit household i with paternal surname s at date t. This household was formed at date t− 1.
The children’s incomes arise as
ymist = rzip,t−1 + e
m
ist ; y
f
ist = rzip,t−1 + e
f
ist , (7)
where z is family income, which we assume to be the average income of the father and mother’s
income: zip,t−1 ≡ (ymip,t−1 + yfip,t−1)/2. The e innovations are i.i.d. N(0, Ve) and r ∈ (0, 1) is a
household inheritance parameter. The distribution of z is endogenous. We prove its existence
below. The parameters r and Ve are exogenous and determine the process of income transmission
given the income of the two parents.
20We are thankful to Melvin Coles for this insight.
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Mating determines the distribution of family incomes for the subsequent generation, given the
distribution of incomes of sons and daughters of the current one. The incomes of the current
generation’s male children become that of the next generation’s fathers: ymipt = y
m
ist. Each father
forms a household with a female who becomes a mother. The income of the mother is described
by a mating technology, a function f(ym, u) that combines each father’s income, ymipt, with a mating
shock, uipt, to assign to each father a spousal income, y
f
ipt, such that the distribution implied by
f(ym, u) coincides with that implied by the inheritance process (7) for the population of female
children at date t. The function that we use is
yfipt = λy
m
ipt + uipt ; uipt ∼ N (0, Vu) , (8)
where λ ∈ (0, 1) — the correlation between spousal incomes — is the degree of assortative mating.
Note that Equation (8) is silent on the particular assignment mechanism that ‘mates’ the distri-
butions of ymist and y
f
ist from Equation (7). For our purposes, it is sufficient to simply form a set
of ordered pairs, (ymist, y
f
ist), that satisfy two properties: (i) they capture the notion of assortative
mating that we are interested in, and (ii) they are consistent with the distributions implied by the
inheritance processes (7). Examples of more fully-articulated assignment mechanisms are in Becker
(1973), Gavila´n (2012), Kremer and Maskin (1995), Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) and Shimer and
Smith (2000).
In Appendix A we show that Equations (7) and (8) imply a stationary distribution for family
income, z. Inspection of the inheritance processes, Equation (7), then implies that, since r < 1,
the stationary distributions of male and female income must be the same,
ymist ∼ N (0, Vy) ; yfist ∼ N (0, Vy) , (9)
where Vy is a unique function of the model’s structural parameters, r, Ve and λ. This function is
characterized in Appendix A. We assume that the variance of the mating shock is Vu = (1−λ2)Vy.
This guarantees that the distribution of brides has the same cross-sectional distribution as that of
female income.
Note that the inheritance parameter r from Equation (7) relates male children’s income to the
income of their parents’ household. The model of Section 3 and most of our empirical work, in
contrast, refer to the correlation between children and their father. This is because surnames are
passed along only the male lineage. Therefore, in order to understand how assortative mating
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affects the ICS we must describe how the parameters r, Ve and λ are manifest in both the variance
of the income Vy and the parameter ρ from the following expression:
ymist = ρy
m
ip,t−1 + w
m
ist , (10)
where the variance of w is denoted Vw. This equation links the income of sons to their fathers,
a relationship that depends on both the mating process, (8), and the household-level inheritance
process (7).
Note also that, for issues of intergenerational mobility, the appropriate measure of inheritance
is ρ and not r. This is because ρ associates comparable variables — the incomes of children with
their father — whereas r from Equation (7) does not. The latter associates the income of one
individual with the consolidated income of their childhood household, something that arises from
the noisy lottery of mating.21
In Appendix A we prove the following property:
Property 4 There exists a unique stationary distribution for ymist and y
f
ist that is characterized by
ρ =
r(1 + λ)
2
; Vw = Ve
(
1 +
r2(1− λ)
4λ
)
; Vy =
Ve
λ(1 + λ)
A larger degree of assortative mating — as measured by a larger value for λ, the correlation of
spousal income — thus translates into a larger value of ρ. Stronger assortative mating implies less
intergenerational mobility in the population of fathers and sons. This is true even if the correlation
between the income of sons and the joint income of their parents, r, is held constant. The intuition
is straightforward. More assortative mating implies that the father’s income is more informative
for the income of the mother. Both father and mother contribute to the characteristics of their
son. Thus, the more the income of the father explains the income of the mother, the more it must
explain the income of his son. Stronger assortative mating translates into lower intergenerational
mobility.
The same intuition applies to any other inheritable trait, like ethnicity. Females, of course, play
an important role in determining the ethnicity of a household’s children. Keeping in mind that
21One could, alternatively, use an analogous parameter that associates the consolidated income of each household
with the consolidated income of that household’s children’s households. Indeed, a number of existing studies on
mobility and assortative mating do just this. We choose to focus on ρ from Equation (10) because (i) it is perfectly
coherent, (ii) it is the parameter that is estimated in the most of the existing literature on mobility, and (iii) it is
tightly linked to the process of surname diffusion.
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surnames capture ethnicity only insofar as it is transmitted across the male lineage, it becomes
clear that assortative mating is pivotal. It is the only way with which a mother’s ethnicity can
be correlated with her children’s surname. Consider, for example, Judaism in which (ignoring
conversion) ethnicity is solely passed along the maternal line. Absent assortative mating — e.g.,
if Jewish women marry men randomly drawn from the entire population of males — surnames
must eventually become uncorrelated with the Jewishness of their holders. On the other hand,
if Jewish women marry only Jewish men, then the surnames of Jews will become increasingly
distinct from those of gentiles, owing both to the initial distribution of Jewish male surnames and
to the surname birth/death process described previously. This mechanism applies to virtually
any other ethnicity-related characteristic. Since females are in almost all cases fundamental for
the inheritance of ethnic characteristics, assortative mating and the degree of ethnic information
contained in surnames go hand-in-hand.
To summarize, surnames are passed exclusively along the male line. They do not provide any
direct information about the mother. Any information that is indirectly associated with the mother
must arise because the characteristics of the father are correlated with those of the mother. This is
the mechanism through which assortative mating can affect the ICS. In the language of our model,
the ICS depends only on the correlation and conditional variance of the incomes of fathers and
sons: the parameters ρ and Vw, respectively. But assortative mating affects ρ and, therefore, it
affects the ICS. This lends valuable interpretation to our empirical findings in the next subsection.
10.2 Assortative Mating: Evidence
We have seen that surnames contain information on two characteristics: ethnicity and educational
attainment. This, combined with the Spanish naming convention, allows us to obtain measurements
of the level and change in ethnic/educational assortative mating in Catalonia. As we have seen,
an increase in the degree of assortative mating translates into an increase in the prevalence of
inheritance, and of the ICS.
Our identification strategy is best illustrated with an example. The surname Casals is associated
with a high value of our CatalanDegree variable. The same applies to the surname Pujol. A person
whose complete–surname is “Casals Pujol” — a person whose father is Casals and mother is Pujol
— is therefore almost certainly a person with two parents of Catalan regional origin. Ethnic
assortative mating, then, can be measured by the incidence of such complete surnames relative to
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those that are more ethnically-heterogeneous. The measurement is simple correlation between the
ethnicity index of each person’s first and second surname.
Note that this measurement applies to each individual’s parents, not to each individual’s
spouse.22 That is, if we find evidence of increased assortative mating among the 25-30 year-old
cohort in the 2001 Catalan census, this means (very roughly) that the 50-55 old cohort exhibited
more assortative mating than those one generation older.
The data are constructed by first associating to each surname two characteristics: the average
level of education and the average value of CatalanDegree, where the average is taken across
all individuals with that particular surname. We then run two sets of regressions, one for each
characteristic. The LHS variable is each individual’s first surname’s characteristic and the RHS
variables are the set of controls used above along with their second surname’s characteristic.
Figure 11 displays the results. We plot the value of the parameters for the regression of education
(Figure 11(a)) and for the regression on CatalanDegree (Figure 11(b)) for the moving window of
cohorts described above.23 Assortative mating in both characteristics is clearly increasing, and
education has a timing that resembles the timing of the increase in the ICS.
In order to make sure that our results are not driven by ethnicity we run the same regressions
on ethnically homogeneous populations (Figure 12(a)) and on populations with very infrequent
surnames (Figure 12(b)). The results are qualitatively identical.
To summarize, we have found evidence that intergenerational mobility in educational attain-
ment has decreased in Catalonia in the 20th century. One possible explanation is that assortative
mating has increased. Surname data is consistent with this explanation, suggesting an increase in
the likelihood that people mate with others of similar educational levels and ethnic backgrounds.24
22In our data, we do not know who is married with whom. We do not have explicit links between husbands and
wives. Therefore, we cannot directly compute the correlation between them. But, thanks to the Spanish naming
convention, we can estimate the analogous correlation for each person’s parents.
23Section 6.3 of our online appendix reports the same exercise splitting the population into those born before/after
1950.
24Some existing work on increased assortative mating attributes it to an increased level of education among
females. As above, one needs to be careful not to confuse this story with the effect of an increase in average
educational attainment. Suppose, for instance, that the primary driver of assortative mating is wealth. Suppose
also that there has been no change in the tendency for people to assortatively mate. If the daughters of the rich
experience an increase in education that is larger than the daughters of the poor — something that is very plausible
— then one might mistakenly conclude that assortative mating has increased, in the educational dimension, although
in reality it has not. Our methodology does not suffer from this possible bias because our measures do not refer to
the individual woman, but to her family. Education and ethnicity are imputed by the surname, not measured at an
individual level.
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11 Conclusions
Our paper makes two contributions, one methodological and one applied. Methodologically, we
develop a framework that shows how an untapped data source can shed light on a question that
requires much data, but for which relatively little data exists. We show that a single cross-sectional
census can reveal much about both the level and the change in intergenerational mobility. The key
data objects are surnames, markers that provide intergenerational links where more explicit links
are unavailable. Surnames define a partition of a population. Elements of this partition associated
with rare surnames will be correlated with the partition that groups people according to familial
linkages. A particular moment of these partitions — that which we label the Informational Content
of Surnames (ICS) — connects the familial linkages with familial economic status and thus provides
information on intergenerational mobility. This method yields measures of the degree of mobility
at a point in time as well as its evolution across time.25
Our method would be of limited practical value in the presence of multi-country, intergenera-
tional panel data. However the existence of such data is quite limited. The practical relevance of
our method, therefore, depends on how much data we do have on the joint distribution of surnames
and economic outcomes. Here, there is reason to be optimistic. Most countries compile censuses
containing such data. We’ve shown that one can learn much from one census. Multiple census,
both within and across countries, can obviously yield much more. Comparability, over time and
across countries, can be handled. The US, for example, has a different surname distribution than
Spain. The essence of our method — the idea that rare surnames connect people with familial
linkages — is nevertheless unaffected.
Our practical contribution is to use our methodology to ask how and why intergenerational
mobility has changed over time. We study Catalonia, a large region of Spain. Using the 2001
census we show that the explanatory power of surnames — the ICS — has increased. Part of
this is due to the increased explanatory power of ethnicity. But there is more going on. There
is a component of the ICS that is unrelated to ethnicity and the impact of this component has
25Several studies estimate mobility for a given country (Lillard and Kilburn (1995), Dearden, Machin, and Reed
(1997), Wiegand (1997), Osterberg (2000), Osterbacka (2001), Hertz (2001), Dunn (2007), Ferreira and Veloso
(2006), Leigh (2007), Ng (2007)). And a growing body of work has attempts to compare mobility across coun-
tries: several studies compare the USA to other countries (Bjo¨rklund and Ja¨ntti (1997), Couch and Dunn (1997),
Checchi, Ichino, and Rustichini (1999), Bjo¨rklund et al. (2002), Grawe (2004)); and Comi (2003) uses the European
Community Household Panel to obtain estimates for 12 EU countries. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind
the problems that plague cross-country analysis (Solon (2002)). Our method may represent promise in this context.
Our model can be calibrated to specifically incorporate some of the cross-country heterogeneity that forms some of
the basis of Solon’s critique. We leave this to future research.
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also increased. This is true among very ethnically-homogeneous individuals, among siblings, and
among people with infrequent surnames. Our model, alongside an extensive set of controls and
robustness checks, associates this increase in the ICS with a decrease in intergenerational mobility.
Our model and data also offer one possible explanation. Assortative mating along the ethnic
dimension appears to have increased in tandem with the decrease in mobility.
To wrap-up, we offer some historical context. In Spain and Catalonia, the different generations
of the 20th century witnessed large-scale increases in both the level of publicly-provided education
and the level of educational attainment. Nevertheless, we’ve found that educational mobility
has decreased. That is, the importance of family-specific characteristics for educational outcomes
has increased. Is their a logical contradiction here? If one looks around and sees that almost
everyone’s educational attainment exceeds that of their parents, does this mean that the importance
of inheritance and familial linkages must have diminished? The answer is no. Such logic confuses
aggregate growth — an increase in the mean of the distribution — with mobility, which is all
about movement within the distribution. It is at the heart of the common misperception that to
do better than one’s parents means to have beaten the odds and done better than expected. This
can generate an upward bias in our perception of intergenerational mobility in growing economies.
It is an illusion. It is just growth. Mobility works along its own path. It is defined only in relative
terms. To measure mobility, it is not enough to compare my welfare with that of my parents. I
must also consider the children of other parents, parents that were both richer and poorer than my
own. Today’s generation may well live better than yesterday’s, while at the same owing a greater
thanks to their parents for their place in the cross-sectional distribution.
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(a) Time series of average number of agents per sur-
name
(b) Times series of Gini of surname distribution
(c) Ordered frequency distribution, G(k) (d) Lorenz curve of surname distribution
Figure 1: Time series of number of agents per surname and Gini coefficient, and, for different
values of ρ, the surname distribution G(k) and associated Lorenz curve.
Notes: Model Simulations with baseline parameter values: N0=1000000; Vε=1.000; µ=0.0200; q=0.50; m=2; ρ ∈ [0.05, 0.95]. Different
initial conditions: number of surnames= 10, 1000, 100000 and 1000000.
Figure 2: Surnames are informative, and their informational content increases with the degree of inheritance that
there is in society.
We now turn to our main result, the behavior of the ICS. The ICS is a moment of the joint distribution of
surnames and income. Even though the two are independent of one another, the ICS connects them and reveals
information about the latter based on the markers inherent in the former.
Property 3: ICS and the importance of inheritance
Under the conditions of Property 2 the ICS from equation (5) is approximately constant for all t > k.
Moreover, for any t > k, the ICS is monotonically increasing in the value of the inheritance parameter
ρ.
The proof is in Appendix A. The monotonicity result is analytic whereas the constancy result is shown via simu-
lation.
Figure 2 plots the ICS against ρ for our baseline parameter values. Aside from confirming our results on
monotonicity, what’s quite striking is the level and the convexity. Relatively small values for the ICS are associated
with moderately large values of ρ and only for very high values of ρ do we see ICS values above, say, 10%. Again,
echoing comments made above, this is necessarily the case given that only the rare surnames can be informative.
To summarize, the results of this section are as follows. First, without mutations the number of surnames will
tend to become small, with each name conveying very little information about familial linkages and, therefore,
inheritance. Second, mutations provide a countervailing force, allowing many rare surnames to have informational
content. Finally, the informational content of these rare surnames — the ICS from equation (5) — is, ceteris
paribus, monotonically increasing in the magnitude of the inheritance parameter, ρ. This is what allows us to
identify the magnitude of ρ from data on the joint distribution of surnames and economic outcomes. We now turn
to our empirical implementation of our model.
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(a) Average R2L (solid line) and R
2
F (dotted line) against ρ
Figure 2: Surnames are informative, and their informational content increases with the degree of
inheritance that there is in society.
Notes: Model Simulations with baseline parameter values: as in Figure 1.
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Figure 3: Distribution of the first surname in Catalonia and Lorenz curves for Spain and Catalonia
For 3(a): Population: Spanish citizens living in Catalonia aged 25 and above, all surnames. Source: 2001 Catalan census.
For 3(b): Population: All phones with first and second surnames not missing. Population percentage per surname (1% Steps). Source:
2004 Spanish telephone directory and 2001 Catalan census.
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Figure 4: ICS is larger for less frequent surnames
Notes: ICS (solid line) and individuals per surname (dotted line). Regressions as in Table 2 (Columns 3 and 4) by percentiles, where
percentile x corresponds to the x% least-frequent surnames. Source: 2001 Catalan Census.
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(a) Evolution of ICS
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(b) Evolution of parameter of CatalanDegree
Figure 5: Evolution of ICS and parameter of CatalanDegree over moving windows of cohorts
Notes: Regressions as in Table 2 (Columns 3 and 4). The overlapping sequence of cohorts starts with those aged 75-100 years old in
2001, then continues with those aged 70-95 years old, and so on, ending with the 25-50 year-old cohort. Source: 2001 Catalan Census.
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Figure 6: Evolution of ICS over moving windows of cohorts. No ethnic controls.
Notes: Regressions as in Table 2 (Columns 5 and 6). Overlapping age-cohorts are described in caption to Figure 5. Source: 2001
Catalan Census.
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(a) 50% Most Catalan Surnames
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(b) 50% Least Frequent Surnames
Figure 7: Evolution of ICS over moving windows of cohorts, subpopulations.
Notes: Regressions as in Table 2 (Columns 5 and 6). Overlapping age-cohorts are described in caption to Figure 5. Source: 2001
Catalan Census.
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(b) Standard Deviation
Figure 8: Evolution of years of education over moving windows of cohorts
Notes: Overlapping age-cohorts are described in caption to Figure 5. Source: 2001 Catalan Census.
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(b) Complete–surnames shared by 2 or 3 people
Figure 9: Evolution of Sibling Correlation Proxy, SCP over moving windows of cohorts.
Notes: Regressions include age and place of birth dummies. Overlapping age-cohorts are described in caption to Figure 5. Source:
2001 Catalan Census.
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(b) Complete–surnames shared by 2 or 3 people
Figure 10: Evolution of Sibling Correlation Proxy, SCP over moving windows of cohorts. 50%
Most Catalan Surnames
Notes: Regressions include age and place of birth dummies. Overlapping age-cohorts are described in caption to Figure 5. Source: 2001
Catalan Census.
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(b) AM in CatalanDegree
Figure 11: Evolution of Assortative Mating in Education & CatalanDegree over moving windows
of cohorts.
Notes: Regressions include age and place of birth dummies. Overlapping age-cohorts are described in caption to Figure 5. Population:
Male Spanish citizens living in Catalonia aged 25 and above, with frequency of first and second surname larger than one. Source: 2001
Catalan Census.
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(b) 50% Least Frequent Surnames
Figure 12: Evolution of Assortative Mating in Education over moving windows of cohorts, sub-
populations.
Notes: Regressions as in Figure 11. Overlapping age-cohorts are described in caption to Figure 5. Source: 2001 Catalan Census.
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Table 1: Surnames Distribution: Gini Index and People per Surname in Catalonia and Spain
Spain Catalonia
(PhoneBook) (Census) (PhoneBook) (Census)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All All Only males
Number of People 11,397,116 6,123,909 2,073,219 2,983,384
Number of Surnames 155,782 91,568 61,396 63,141
People per Surname 73.161 66.878 33.768 47.249
Gini Index 0.9485 0.9304 0.9028 0.908
Populations: Columns (1-3): All individuals/phones with first & second surnames not missing.
Column 4: Men with first & second surnames not missing. Source: 2004 Spanish telephone
directory and 2001 Catalan Census.
Table 2: ICS. Baseline population.
LHS: years of education (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CatalanDegreeSurname2 1.706(0.011) 1.015(0.012) 1.707 (0.011)
Surname Dummies Yes Yes
Fake Surnames Dummies Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.2652 0.2735 0.2980 0.2735 0.2955 0.2653
Surnames jointly significant∗ Yes No Yes No
(p-value) 0.000 0.534 0.000 0.601
Notes: All regressions include age and place of birth dummies. Fake-surnames have the same distribution as Surnames
and are allocated randomly. (*) F-test if Surname dummies are jointly significant. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Population: Male Spanish citizens living in Catalonia aged 25 and above, with frequency of first surname larger than
one. Number of observations: 2,057,134. Number of surnames: 30,610. Source: 2001 Catalan Census.
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Table 3: ICS. Subpopulations.
(a) Born in Catalonia.
LHS: years of education (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CatalanDegreeSurname2 1.683 (0.012) 0.98(0.013) 1.682(0.012)
Surname Dummies Yes Yes
Fake-Surname Dummies Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.1543 0.1668 0.2016 0.1666 0.1979 0.1541
Surnames jointly significant∗ Yes No Yes No
(p-value) 0.000 0.934 0.000 0.917
(b) Born in Catalonia before 1950.
LHS: years of education (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CatalanDegreeSurname2 1.019(0.021) 0.609(0.022) 1.017(0.021)
Surname Dummies Yes Yes
Fake Surnames Dummies Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.1331 0.1375 0.1752 0.1373 0.1737 0.1329
Surnames jointly significant∗ Yes No Yes No
(p-value) 0.000 0.698 0.000 0.687
(c) 50% Most Catalan Surnames.
LHS: years of education (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CatalanDegreeSurname2 0.971(0.014) 0.783(0.015) 0.972(0.014)
Surname Dummies Yes Yes
Fake Surnames Dummies Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.2466 0.2501 0.2777 0.2501 0.2757 0.2467
Surnames jointly significant∗ Yes No Yes No
(p-value) 0.000 0.299 0.000 0.318
Notes: Regressions as in table 2. For 3(a): Number of observations: 1,328,003. Number of surnames: 28,523. For
3(b): Number of observations: 465,896. Number of surnames: 20,793. For 3(c): Number of observations: 1,028,567.
Number of surnames: 23,892. Source: 2001 Catalan Census.
Table 4: ICS. 50% Least Frequent Surnames.
LHS: years of education (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CatalanDegreeSurname2 1.467(0.015) 0.801(0.016) 1.464(0.015)
Surname Dummies Yes Yes
Fake Surnames Dummies Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.2597 0.2664 0.3038 0.2666 0.3020 0.2600
Surnames jointly significant∗ Yes No Yes No
(p-value) 0.000 0.12 0.000 0.095
Notes: Regressions as in table 2. Number of observations: 1,028,727. Number of surnames: 30,275. Source: 2001
Catalan Census.
Table 5: Calibrated Parameter Values. No Ethnicity Controls
Parameters: Baseline Model: Differential Fertility Model:
ρ 0.609 0.611
µ 0.0067 0.0067
m 5 5
d −0.15
Moments: Data
ICS 0.0302 0.0302 0.0302
PPS 47.878 47.872 47.2500
Frequency −24.405 −31.256
Gini 0.7426 0.7435 0.9080
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Table 6: Calibrated Parameter Values. With Ethnicity Controls
Parameters: Baseline Model: Differential Fertility Model:
ρ 0.563 0.529
µ 0.0067 0.0086
m 5 6
d −0.1
Moments: Data
ICS 0.0245 0.0245 0.0245
PPS 47.194 45.085 47.2500
Frequency −30.045 −24.625
Gini 0.7382 0.7435 0.9080
Table 7: Calibration Sensitivity Analysis
2 3 4 5 6
0.0041 0.713 0.684 0.684 0.684 0.684
0.0053 0.655 0.655 0.655 0.655 0.655
0.0067 0.655 0.626 0.597 0.597 0.597
0.0086 0.626 0.568 0.568 0.568 0.539
0.0109 0.597 0.539 0.539 0.539 0.539
Notes: Values of ρ that match the ICS for various (µ,m) pairs. The small differ-
ences in ρ between this table and Table 5 are an artifact of the grid that we use
to evaluate our model and the linear interpolation scheme that we use to match
exactly empirical moments.
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A Appendix: Proofs of Model’s Properties
Proof of Property 1
Consider some date t − 1 and a surname s ∈ Ω such that Ft−1(s) > 0. Define Qt−1(s) as the number of
individuals with surname s so that Qt−1(s) = Nt−1Ft−1(s). Note that, conditional on Qt−1(s), Qt(s) is a
binomial random variable with support [0,mQt−1(s)] and distribution (suppressing the ‘(s)′ notation)
Prob(Qt = km) =
(
Qt−1
k
)
qk(1− q)Qt−1−k . (11)
The conditional mean and variance of Qt are Qt−1mq and Qt−1m2q(1− q), respectively. Therefore,
Qt = Qt−1mq + wt , (12)
where wt is defined as the innovation, wt ≡ Qt − Et−1Qt. If mq = 1 then Qt follows a driftless random
walk.26
Proof of Property 3
Fix some date t. Partition the population into families: groups of individuals who share the same lineage
(which is possible because of asexual reproduction). Suppose, to begin with, that every family’s lineage
dates back k periods and that no two families share the same surname. Then the cross-sectional mean
and variance of income for each family are, respectively,
E(yist | s) = ρkys,t−k (13)
Var(yist | s) = Vε
k−1∑
l=0
ρ2l (14)
where ys,t−k is the income of the patriarch of the family with surname s. Now recognize that the society-
wide cross-sectional variance can be decomposed into the average within-family variance and across-family
variance in the conditional mean:
Var(yist) = E
(
Var(yist | s)
)
+ Var
(
E(yist | s)
)
. (15)
26This is related to the “branching process” literature. It was started by Francis Galton in 1873. He posed the
following problem (our model with zero mutation).
Problem 4001: A large nation, of whom we will only concern ourselves with the adult males, N in
number, and who each bear separate surnames, colonise a district. Their law of population is such
that, in each generation, a0 percent of the adult makes have no make children who reach adult life; a1
have one such male child; a2 have two; and so on up to a5 who have five.
Find (1) what proportion of the surnames will have become extinct after r generations; and (2) how
many instances there will be of the same surname being held by m persons.
The answer was finally figured out using martingale methods, but not until in 1950! It’s kind of complicated, but
the upshot is that, with strictly positive population growth a fraction q of all surnames with vanish with probability
1 and a fraction (1− q) will persist forever (U.S. data on q suggests about 0.8). The distribution for the surviving
names is exponential. This is from “Branching processes since 1873,” by David Kendall. Google this title and you’ll
find it right away.
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The ICS from Equation (5) is proportional to the second term on the right which, according to expression
(13) is monotonically increasing in ρ. This proves Property 3 for the case identical lineage horizons and
unique within-family surnames.
Consider next the general case of lineage horizons that vary across families. Suppose that family j all
derive from a patriarch who lived kj periods before date t. Then Equations (13) and (14) remain valid
for each kj and Equation 15 takes the form of family-size weighted means and variances. Nevertheless,
holding fixed the structure of the population, the second term on the right of Equation (15) remains a
monotonically increasing function of ρ.
Finally, relax the assumption that surnames and families are uniquely associated. If family j1 and
family j2 share the same surname, s, then E(yist ; s) is a family-size-weighted average of the incomes of all
of the members of the two families. Such averaging will, of course, decrease the cross-sectional variance in
the conditional means, Var(E(yist | s)), thereby decreasing the ICS. However, holding fixed the population
structure, it remains the case that this conditional variance, and the ICS, are increasing in ρ.
Proof of Property 4
Here, we demonstrate that our assortative mating model from Section 10.1 has a unique stationary dis-
tribution and derive expressions for the models variances and correlations in terms of its structural pa-
rameters.
Recall that male and female children in the ith household with surname s at date t have income
described by
ymist = rzip,t−1 + e
m
ist ; y
f
ist = rzip,t−1 + e
f
ist , (16)
where zip,t−1 is the average income of these children’s parents, who formed this household at date t − 1,
r is the household inheritance parameter and the innovations e are i.i.d. N(0, Ve). We now suppress the i
and s notation (they are not needed here). Mating is described by
yfpt = λy
m
pt + upt ; upt ∼ N (0, Vu) . (17)
First, we guess that there exists a stationary distribution for z that has the form N(0, Vz). If so, then
parental income at date t+ 1 — formed from the date t mating rule (17) — satisfies
zpt =
(
ympt + y
f
pt
)
/2 =
(
(1 + λ)ympt + upt
)
/2 (18)
where the first equation is just the definition of average parental income and the second applies the mating
rule (17). Applying the inheritance process (16), we get
2zpt =
(
rzp,t−1 + emt
)(
1 + λ
)
+ upt .
The variance of the distribution of z, then (if it exists), results from taking the unconditional variance of
both sides and imposing stationarity:
Vz =
(1 + λ)2Ve + Vu
4− (1 + λ)2r2 . (19)
This gives Vz as a function of the structural parameters λ, Ve and r, and the variance of mating noise, Vu,
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which is uniquely determined below.
Next, note that a stationary distribution for z implies that the income of male and female children
have the same distribution (i.e., by inspection of Equation (16)). Thus, we can write ymist ∼ N (0, Vy) and
yfist ∼ N (0, Vy), for some variance, Vy, to be uniquely determined below. Given this, the mating rule,
Equation (17), imposes that
Vu =
(
1− λ2)Vy . (20)
This guarantees that the distribution of female income implied by the mating rule coincides with that
implied by the inheritance process.
Next, consider the income of males at date t+ 1. Using (16) and (18):
ymt+1 =
r(1 + λ)
2
ympt + rupt/2 + e
m
t+1. (21)
Since r < 1 and λ < 1, then r(1 + λ)/2 < 1. Given the independence assumptions on u and e, and given
that fertility is deterministic (with each male bearing one male offspring), then Equation (21) gives the
income of a male as stationary Gaussian first-order autoregressive function of the income of his father.
Its unconditional distribution is
ymt ∼ N
(
0 ,
r2Vu/4 + Ve
1− r2(1 + λ)2/4
)
.
By a cross-sectional law-of-large numbers, this also gives the stationary cross-sectional distribution of male
income.
All that remains is to solve for Vy as a function of the model’s structural parameters. Using this last
expression and rearranging:
Vy =
Ve
λ(1 + λ)
,
where the second equation follows from Equation (20) and the third follows from solving for Vy and
rearranging. Substituting the result into Equation (19) yields:
Vz =
λ(1 + λ)2Ve + 2(1− λ)Ve
λ(4− (1 + λ)2r2)
This implies that there does indeed exist a stationary distribution for average parental income, z, that
is consistent with the inheritance and mating rules, (16) and (17). The variance of the male inheritance
shock, wmist from Equation (10), is
Vw = Ve
(
1 +
r2(1− λ)
4λ
)
.
B Appendix: Surnames as proxy of Ethnicity
How good of a proxy of ethnicity is our CatalanDegree variable? We know several things that can help
us understand. First, a large percentage of intra-Spanish immigration into Catalonia occurred after 1955.
Second, this immigration flow was large; without it Cabre´ (2004) estimates that the year 2000 population
would have been 2.7 million instead of the actual value of roughly 6 million.
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These facts tell us that, in the 2001 census, older people, and especially those born in Catalonia, are
more likely to be of Catalan origin than younger people. If our CatalanDegree variable is a good proxy
for regional origin, it should therefore reflect this. Table A1 shows that it does. The overall average
of CatalanDegree in 0.34, whereas among people born prior to 1950, in Catalonia, the average is 0.57.
Figure A1 elaborates. It plots the mean and standard deviation of CatalanDegree for the same rolling
window of cohorts used in Figure 5. The surname distribution in Catalonia has clearly become ‘less
Catalan’ over time, as the immigration flows tell us it should if our proxy is a good one.
As further support for the quality of our CatalanDegree proxy we run two probit regressions. In the
first, the left-hand-side (LHS) variable takes value 1 if an individual has full knowledge of the Catalan
language.27 The right-hand-side variables (RHS) are, in column (1), individual-specific controls (place
of birth and age dummies). In column (2) our CatalanDegree variable is added. Results are reported
in Table A2(a). We estimate a large, significant, positive probability. Figure A2(a) shows the estimated
probability for the relevant range of the CatalanDegree variable.
The second regression asks how well CatalanDegree predicts immigration history. The LHS variable
takes value 1 if an individual 50 years of age or older immigrated into Catalonia from elsewhere in Spain.
Results are reported in Table A2(b) and Figure A2(b). The estimates are negative, large and signifi-
cant and the pseudo-R2 increases dramatically with the inclusion of CatalanDegree. People with lower
CatalanDegree surnames are much more likely to be immigrants than those with higher CatalanDegree
surnames.
Notice that our dynamic results cannot be driven by a hypothetical change over time in the quality
of CatalanDegree as a measure of ethnicity. The reason is as follows. If CatalanDegree had become a
worse proxy of ethnicity over time, then the ICS (controlling for ethnicity) would have increased. However,
the direct effect of ethnicity would have decreased. However, we observe the opposite (see Figure 5(b)).
Moreover, following R1’s suggestions, we now report the evolution of the ICS without controlling for
ethnicity (see Figure 6). It displays the same increasing profile as does the ICS that controls for ethnicity.
To sum up, the CatalanDegree variable seems to approximate ethnicity quite well.
C Appendix: Invented Catalonias
Our results should not be sensitive to any random (but sufficiently large) partitioning of the surnames
set. As as example, we divide the letters of the alphabet to two groups, “first half” and “second half”.
Table A3 does exactly this. The first column reports, for comparison purposes, the overall ICS from Table
2. The second and third report the same statistics but for two “invented Catalonias:” those from the
first half of the alphabet and those from the second half.28 As our model predicts, neither the R2 of the
regressions nor the ICS change across the populations.
27The census question asks a resident if she speaks, reads and writes Catalan. Roughly 45% of the over-25
population responded in the affirmative.
28We have done the experiment with other random groupings, and obtained the same result.
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Figure A1: Evolution of CatalanDegree over moving windows of cohorts
Notes: Overlapping age-cohorts are described in caption to Figure 5. Source: 2001 Catalan Census.
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(b) Probability of being an immigrant
Figure A2: Probabilities of Catalan language knowledge and of being an immigrant, as a function
of CatalanDegree.
Notes: Regressions as in Table A2. For Figure A2(a), reference individual is a male, aged 50-55, born in the county of Barcelona. For
Figure A2(b), reference individual is a male, aged 60-65. Source: 2001 Catalan Census.
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Table A1: CatalanDegree Summary Statistics
Baseline population Born in Catalonia Born anywhere in Spain
before 1950 before 1950 after 1950
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean CatalanDegreeSurname2 0.344 0.566 0.367 0.324
Standard deviation (0.302) (0.324) (0.312) (0.292)
Share with CatalanDegreeSurname2>0.16 0.568 0.836 0.596 0.545
Observations 2,057,134 465,896 937,441 1,119,693
Source: 2001 Catalan Census.
Table A2: CatalanDegree & Probabilities of Catalan language knowledge and of being an immi-
grant
(a) Probability of Catalan language knowledge
LHS: Knowledge of Catalan (1) (2)
CatalanDegreeSurname2 0.649 (.004)
Log likelihood -1106700.3 -1092203.9
Pseudo R2 0.2196 0.2298
(b) Probability of being immigrant
LHS: Immigrant (1) (2)
CatalanDegreeSurname2 -4.156(.009)
Log likelihood -645813.49 -410908.05
Pseudo R2 0.0061 0.3676
Notes: Probit Estimates. All regressions include age dummies. Regressions in table A2(a) also include place of birth dummies. Standard
errors in parenthesis. For A2(a): Population: baseline population. The LHS variable Knowledge of Catalan takes value 1 for individuals
who understand, can speak, can read and can write the Catalan language and zero otherwise. Number of observations: 2,057,134. For
A2(b): Population: Individuals born before 1950 of baseline population. The LHS variable Immigrant takes value 1 for individuals who
were not born in Catalonia and zero otherwise. Number of observations: 937,441. Source: 2001 Catalan Census.
Table A3: ICS. “Invented” Catalonias.
All surnames 1st half alphabet 2nd half alphabet
LHS: years of education (1) (2) (3)
CatalanDegreeSurname2 Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2, Surname Dummies 0.2980 0.2992 0.2969
Adjusted R2, Fake-Surname Dummies 0.2735 0.2728 0.2743
ICS 0.0245 0.0264 0.0226
Observations 2,057,134 1,046,996 1,010,138
Notes: Regressions as in table 2 (columns 3 and 4). Source: 2001 Catalan Census.
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